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COUSIN HUMPHREY 
Ruth Wedgwood* 
Chief Justice John Marshall is known for his celebration of a 
strong national voice for the early Supreme Court, and so it is 
hardly surprising that we tend to overlook the philosophical 
cuckoo in his family nest. Not all Americans willingly conceded a 
monopoly in constitutional interpretation to the early nineteenth 
century Court. One of the most powerful challenges to the au-
thority and method of the Supreme Court came from within 
Marshall's family, scattered across the frontier of Virginia and 
Kentucky. 
Distant from the frontier's problems of economy and poli-
tics, the Court used a lace-cuff coastal jurisprudence of vested 
rights to overthrow the land laws of the backcountry, designed to 
assist settlers clearing and improving the land. Henry Clay 
warned that the judgments in Green v. Biddle,l overturning Ken-
tucky land laws, threatened "the most tremendous effects of any 
ever delivered by a judicial tribunal."2 Rhetorical insurrection-
ists accused the Court of imposing an alien jurisprudence, un-
suited to the circumstances of ordinary men and local needs. 
A fractious member of John Marshall's own family joined 
this levee en masse against the Court, campaigning for interpre-
tive comity. Humphrey Marshall-first cousin and brother-in-
law to the Chief Justice, former Senator, newspaper editor, and, 
oddly enough for a self-styled Federalist, a firebrand of republi-
can rhetoric-insisted that the Supreme Court should give 
weight to the constitutional views of popular bodies, including 
state legislatures, even be checked by popular means. 
Cousin Humphrey lived a provocative life, stubbornly per-
sisting as a Federalist in Kentucky from the 1780s through the 
1820s, even when Federalists were profoundly unpopular. He was 
• Professor of Law, Yale Law School. This essay was presented at the American 
Historical Association. Harry Scheiber, Sandra VanBurkleo, and Robert Bone had 
thoughtful comments. 
1. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823). 
2. Letter from Henry Clay to Benjamin Watkins Leigh (March 6, 1823), in Melba 
Porter Hay et al., eds., The Papers of Henry Clay, Supplement 1793-1852 at 133 (U. Press 
of Kentucky, 1992). 
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a unionist, casting Kentucky's lot with the political consortium of 
the Atlantic coast states, despite the natural gaze of Kentucky 
down its watercourse to the Mississippi, New Orleans, and the 
Gulf of Mexico. He opposed the calls in the 1780s for Kentucky 
to declare unilateral independence from Virginia. He voted for 
ratification of the new federal Constitution in the Virginia Con-
vention in 1788, despite Kentucky's anger that the federal gov-
ernment indifferently defended American navigation rights on 
the Mississippi, and he consented to the Jay Treaty in the United 
States Senate. He constantly denounced and opposed the 
schemes-real and imagined-of Wilkinson, Burr, and Harry In-
nes to involve Kentucky with the Spanish and French in the Mis-
sissippi Valley. Strangely enough for a dyed-in-the-wool 
Federalist,3 one of Cousin Humphrey's most spirited adventures 
toward the end of his life was his attack upon the United States 
Supreme Court. 
Sketching Cousin Humphrey's complaints may help us un-
derstand something of the political culture of the 1820s, and why 
John Marshall's view of a single hierarchical structure for the res-
olution of constitutional questions was seen as unattractive by so 
many Virginians and Kentuckians. It has been a tenet of faith in 
American constitutional law that John Marshall's method and 
logic were right-that the Supreme Court has properly tried to 
enforce a monopoly of voice in constitutional matters and to es-
tablish the High Court's final power to measure the federal Con-
stitution by its own lights, without indulgence of the contrary 
views of state courts or legislators. To those of us who have wit-
nessed the renewed debate of the late twentieth century on how 
to balance the center against the periphery, and how to reconcile 
cooperative union with local desires for self-governing authority, 
the normative superiority of Nathan Dane, Joseph Story, and 
John Marshall may no longer seem self-evident. To those who 
have watched the Supreme Court spurn other guides to interpre-
tation of the federal Constitution-be it the customary interna-
tional law of human rights, or state supreme courts' differing 
views of what rights are fundamental to republican government 
as witnessed by their own constitutions-the federal Supreme 
Court's interpretive hermeticism is less attractive. The possibility 
of a constitutional comity, in which the Court seeks to generate 
3. "The real Federalist, is a Republican," said Humphrey Marshall to Kentucky 
voters in 1810. "I am a Republican-a Federal Republican-an American Republican." 
This is "the very reverse of a Frenchefied-or Spanish Kentucky, Republican." Extract, 
from a hand-bil~ addressed by H. Marshall, to the Independent Electors of Franklin 
County, American Republic (Frankfort, Ky.) 4 (July 10, 1810). 
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consensus, and recognizes other law-speaking bodies as deserv-
ing weight, brings the voices of early Southern Republican writ-
ers back into earshot. The claims of Southern Republican writers 
were strong enough to attract even Cousin Humphrey, when 
Kentucky's own interests were at stake. 
The immediate occasion for Humphrey Marshall's attack on 
the Court was the decision of Green v. Biddle, a challenge to the 
landholding system of Kentucky. Kentucky's laws provided com-
pensation for settlers ejected from improved land when their title 
later proved to be defective. The constitutional battle derived 
from the tension between guaranteeing the proprietary rights of 
Virginia-based land claims in Kentucky, and aiding Kentucky set-
tlers harried by uncertain titles. 
The "Kentucky District of Virginia," as it was called, won 
independence and statehood in 1792. Virginia's charter claims 
ran to the Ohio River and the Mississippi, and the parent state 
consented to Kentucky's independence only after a long period 
of agitation in the west.4 To promote economic growth and at-
tract settlement despite the uncertainty generated by lingering 
Virginia claims, the Kentucky General Assembly early on cre-
ated a remedy for settlers displaced from their land by absentee 
claimants. Kentucky statutes of 1797s and 18126 provided that 
settlers who had a colorable claim of land title could not be 
thrown off their homesteads by a legal action of ejectment or writ 
of right, unless they were paid for permanent improvements 
made to the land: the clearing of forest areas, the preparation of 
fields, and the construction of buildings. Kentucky's statutes also 
limited an ejected farmer's liability for prior use of the land. No 
rents or profits accrued until occupancy was challenged in court 
(under the 1797 statute) or a final judgment was entered (under 
the 1812 statute). 
From Kentucky's point of view, strong policy supported 
these laws. Kentucky needed to settle the land, for prosperity 
and as a buffer against Indian activities. Land warrants had been 
issued profligately by Virginia before Kentucky's independence 
in exchange for military service and for purchase money. Ken-
4. To Kentucky complainants, the 1787 national constitution had a counterrevolu-
tionary cast-guaranteeing the territorial integrity of existing states. No breakaway state 
would be recognized inside existing state borders without the parent state's consent. U.S. 
Const., Art. IV,§ 3. 
5. Ky. Acts 132 (1796-97); 1 Bradford's Ky. Stat. 202. 
6. An Act, to amend an Act, entitled an act concerning Occupying Claimants of 
Land, Ky. Acts 11 (1812), also in William Littell and Jacob Swigert, 2 A Digest of the 
Statute Law of Kentucky 957 (Kendall and Russell, 1822). 
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tucky inherited Virginia's complicated system of perfecting land 
title with innumerable technical requirements whose absence de-
feated a claim. Land warrants gave the right to claim an abstract 
quantity of land, but it was up to a warrantholder to stake his 
claim by "locating" the warrant on vacant acreage; he also had to 
make "entry" on the land, commission and record a private land 
survey, and gain a land patent. There was no public survey of 
plots, and warrants were issued far in excess of Kentucky's arable 
land. The hills and pasture land of Kentucky came to be "shin-
gled" many times over by conflicting claims. Often land could be 
identified only by reference to what water course it lay upon, 
highly approximate distances, and vanished landmarks such as 
buffalo roads and corner trees. With poor survey and recording 
methods, it was only after the actual trial of contested claims, 
with viva voce testimony about the notoriety of landmarks in the 
neighborhood years before, that the superiority of one title over 
another could be established. Farmers would sensibly be reluc-
tant to travel west and improve land when all their work might 
later go for naught.7 
To create an incentive to settlement, Kentucky provided in 
the so-called "occupying claimant" laws that a displaced farmer 
who had a colorable claim to title should at least walk away with 
compensation for the improvements he had made to the land. 
This statute bore resemblance to Roman law,s and the Napole-
onic Code.9 But English common law was unrelievingly harsh. By 
7. See generally, Stephen Aron, How the West Was Lost: The Transformation of 
Kentucky from Daniel Boone to Henry Clay (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1996); Paul Gates, 
Tenants of the Log Cabin, 49 Mississippi Valley Historical Rev. 3 (1962). 
8. See The Institutes of Justinian, Book II, Title I,§ 30 ("if the builder of [a] house 
has possession of the land, and the owner of the latter claims the house by real action, but 
refuses to pay for the materials and the workmen's wages, he can be defeated by the plea 
of fraud, provided the builder's possession is in good faith: for if he knew that the land 
belonged to some one else it may be urged against him that he was to blame for rashly 
building on land owned to his knowledge by another man."); Celsus, Digest, Book 3, in 
The Digest of Justinian, Book Vl, 38 (equity should be adjusted to the facts of the case: 
"You inadvertently bought land belonging to another, built or planted on it, and then 
were evicted by the owner; the good judge's order will vary according to the persons 
involved and the facts of the case"). See also Papinian, Replies, Book 2, in The Digest of 
Justinian, Book Vl, 48 ("[w]here a possessor in good faith has incurred expense on land 
which is shown to belong to someone else, . . . he can be indemnified by raising the 
defense of fraud, at the judge's discretion based on principles of fairness, so long as his 
expenses exceed the amount of profits which he received before joinder of issue. Thus, 
since set-off is allowed, the owner is made to pay the amount spent in excess of profits, 
where the land has been improved"}. 
9. See The Code Napoleon, Book II, Title II, ch. I, If 549-550 ("The mere possessor 
can not make the fruits his own but where he is in possession bonA fide ... He is [a] bonA 
fide possessor who possesses as owner, by virtue of a title transferring the ownership, the 
defects of which title he is ignorant of. He ceases to be bonA fide possessor from the 
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English common law, as well as late eighteenth century Virginia 
common law, the superior titleholder regained possession of land 
without paying compensation for improvements, and with a full 
right to back rents and profits from the prior occupant's use.lo 
Neither the English common law nor the Virginia rule had been 
designed with the particular problems of frontier Kentucky in 
mind. 
The immediate controversy in Green v. Biddle arose from 
the compact Kentucky made with Virginia in 1789 as a condition 
of obtaining independence. Many Virginia families, including the 
Marshalls, made livelihoods trading in Kentucky land, and the 
chance that Virginia claims would be disregarded was unaccept-
able. Kentucky promised Virginia that 
all private rights and interests of lands within the said district 
[of Kentucky), derived from the laws of VIrginia prior to such 
separation, shall remain valid and secure under the laws of the 
proposed state, and shall be determined by the laws now ex-
isting in this state [of Virginia).ll 
In the three decades before Green v. Biddle was decided, Vir-
ginia never suggested that Kentucky's occupying claimant laws 
violated the compact. In Humphrey Marshall's view, as a rather 
good lawyer, the compact meant merely that land claims in Ken-
tucky, derived from Virginia warrants not yet perfected with a 
patent, must be honored and permitted to mature. It did not 
mean that the remedies for conflicting claimants were frozen in 
time. 
moment when such defects are known to him"); id., ch. II, § 1, 'I 555 ("If the owner 
prefers to retain such plantations and structures, he must make good the value of the 
materials and the price of the labor"). 
10. The occupying claimant laws are analyzed in William Weston Fisher III, The 
Law of the Land: An Intellectual History of American Property Doctrine, 1776-1880 at 
180-84 (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1991) and in Sandra VanBurkleo, "That Our 
Pure Republican Principles Might Not Wither": Kentucky's Relief Crisis and the Pursuit of 
"Moral Justice," 1818-1826 (Ph.D. thesis, U. of Minnesota, 1988). 
11. An Act Concerning the Erection of the District of Kentuckey into an Independ-
ent State (1789), § 7, in 13 Hening's Laws of Virginia 17, 19 (Philadelphia, 1823) (empha-
sis added). The proviso was also made part of Kentucky's state constitution, and was 
indirectly referred to in the federal act consenting to the formation of the new state and 
admitting Kentucky into the Union. See Constitution or Form of Government for the 
State of Kentucky, Art. 8, sec. 7 (1792) ("The compact with the State of Virginia, subject 
to such alterations as may be made therein, agreeably to the mode prescribed by the said 
compact, shall be considered as a part of this Constitution"); and An Act declaring the 
consent of Congress, that a new State be formed within the jurisdiction of the Common-
wealth of Virginia, and admitted into this Union, by the name of the State of Kentucky, 1 
Stat. 189 (Feb. 4, 1791) ("Whereas the legislature of the commonwealth of Virginia, by an 
act ... have consented ... ").Kentucky's admission took effect on June 1, 1792. 
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At least one warrant-holder did not agree. Virginian John 
Green brought suit against Kentucky resident Richard Biddle, 
arguing that the interstate compact voided Kentucky's laws re-
quiring compensation for improvements. The 1789 common law 
of Virginia set Kentucky's future course, said Green, and forbade 
Kentucky's legislature from granting any relief to hardscrabble 
farmers. 
What happened next was either a comedy of errors or feck-
less jurisprudence. The dispute was certified to John Marshall's 
Supreme Court in 1816 by a division of the federal circuit court 
in Kentucky, consisting of District Judge Harry Innes and Circuit 
Justice Thomas Todd. Five years went by; the original plaintiff 
died and his heir Betsey Green was substituted; the Supreme 
Court finally called the case in the 1821 winter term. When Bid-
dle's counsel did not arrive from Kentucky, the Court heard 
Green's counsel alone, without an adversary hearing, and passed 
by lingering problems of mootness and imperfect diversity juris-
diction. Joseph Story's cursory opinion for the Court, announced 
seventeen days after the one-sided argument, explained that the 
Virginia-Kentucky compact must be given a weight that went be-
yond a general law of property, and so must accomplish more 
than guarding Virginia warrants and titles. Respect for foreign 
inchoate land titles, a transplantation of Virginia law into Ken-
tucky's jurisdiction, was already mandated by "general principles 
of law" and "the first principles of justice"-a constitutionalized 
choice-of-law unsurprising from the Justice who would, two de-
cades later, write Swift v. Tyson.12 The political compact was 
designed to go further and to prevent any "material impairment" 
whatsoever of the rights and interests of owners of land at the 
hands of the Kentucky legislature. Story rejected any distinction 
of right and remedy: the remedies of Virginia land law were to be 
applied in perpetuity, displacing any subsequent Kentucky 
legislation. 
Kentuckian Henry Clay was present in the District of Co-
lumbia when Story delivered his opinion, and as self-styled attor-
ney for the situation, Clay intervened as friend of the court.13 
The Court's ex parte decision would cause disruption to "numer-
ous occupants of land" throughout the region, warned Clay, and 
deserved full rehearing. The Supreme Court withdrew its deci-
12. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
13. This was the first amicus curiae brief filed in Supreme Court history. 
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sion and set the case down for the February 1822 Term.14 Henry 
Clay and George Bibb appeared for Biddle at the second argu-
ment. Green won again, in an opinion announced by Virginia 
Justice Bushrod Washington in the 1823 term, this time muster-
ing the federal Constitution's contracts clause as the source of 
protection-the interstate compact was a public contract, and 
any of its beneficiaries could sue to enforce it. Newly provoking 
was the Supreme Court's decision to act by a minority vote-
only five of the seven appointed Justices attended the 1823 term, 
and only three joined in the opinion striking down Kentucky's 
land-holding regime. 
There are puzzles throughout the Supreme Court's proce-
dure, minutes, and official report of the case. (These irregulari-
ties are doubly ironic in a case that dwells on the jot and title of 
Virginia's remedies law.) The Court was far from the orderly in-
stitution familiar in our century. Wheaton's United States Re-
ports announces that Kentucky Justice Thomas Todd-Circuit 
Justice for the western Seventh Circuit, who faced an onerous 
journey from Frankfort, Kentucky, to join the February Term-
was "present" at the 1821 Supreme Court decision, and the 1821 
decision is said by Justice Story to be "the unanimous opinion of 
the Court."ts Yet the Supreme Court's manuscript minutes state 
that "Judge Todd did not sit in this cause."t6 Todd was present in 
Court for a portion of the 1822 reargument, left abruptly in the 
middle, and was not present at all in the 1823 term.n The Court 
did not defer decision to await his participation, even though he 
was the Justice most familiar with the practical problems facing 
Kentucky in land use. The factual vernacular of constitutional 
pragmatism, a first hand description of the mischief a statute 
seeks to remedy-brought to the Supreme Court in the twentieth 
century realism of Louis Brandeis-was not yet seen as essential. 
Justice Brockholst Livingston of New York was also missing in 
the 1823 Term, taken ill, and the Court did not await his recovery 
or replacement. 
The greatest puzzle is Chief Justice Marshall. He is noted in 
the minutes and in Wheaton's Reports as present at the 1821 de-
14. Minutes of the Supreme Court, 208 (Mar. 14, 1821), National Archives Micro-
film Publication M215. 
15. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 17 & n.a. 
16. Minutes of the Supreme Court, 192 (Mar. 5, 1821), National Archives Microfilm 
Publication M215. Wheaton's reporting has misled even the most distinguished histori-
ans. See G. Edward White, The Marshall Coun and Cultural Change, 1815-35 at 646 
(Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988). 
17. Minutes of the Supreme Court, 279-288 (Mar. 8-13, 1822), 380 (Feb. 27, 1823), 
National Archives Microfilm Publication M215. 
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cision, and the minutes say he attended the 1822 reargument and 
the 1823 decision, yet at least one newspaper report of the 1823 
decision states that "Marshall refused to sit,"ls and the disap-
pointed litigants speak of the Court as acting only by a three man 
plurality-Bushrod Washington, Joseph Story, and Gabriel Du-
vall, without Marshall.19 One might almost surmise that until the 
last, John Marshall reserved the right to be in or out of the case, 
according to the temper he sensed in the Court's political 
audience. 
Cousin Humphrey Marshall's cannonade at the Supreme 
Court was double-barrelled and let loose even before the revised 
decision. In four essays published in the summer of 1821 in the 
Frankfort Commentator,zo curiously called "I, By Itself," 
Humphrey Marshall lambasted the Court for hearing the case at 
all. The Virginia-Kentucky compact contained an arbitration 
clause; any dispute between the states was to be referred for de-
cision to a panel of arbitrators to be chosen by the two states. 
Immediately after the initial Supreme Court decision was with-
drawn in 1821, negotiations were begun between Virginia and 
Kentucky to set up the arbitration panel. The politically adept 
Henry Clay served as intermediary with Virginia, appealing to 
the common republican past of the sister states in the 1798 fight 
against the Alien and Sedition Acts, and chiding that a family 
dispute should not be resolved by the federal stranger. 
Humphrey Marshall's broadsides mocked the Court for applying 
one part of the compact with severity, while ignoring the arbitra-
tion clause, as if the Court were frightened of any rival law-
speaking voice, thwarting the arbitration as an unwanted chal-
lenge to its guild monopoly.21 And what if both states should 
agree there was no violation of the compact from Kentucky's oc-
18. Occupying Claimant Laws, Argus of Western America (Frankfort, Ky.) 2 (May 
21, 1823); accord, To the Editor of the Lexington {Ky.] Monitor, Richmond Enquirer 
(Richmond, Va.) 3 (Nov. 29, 1822) ("[T]he chief justice, and the associate justice from this 
state, do not sit in the cause now pending ... , in that court, touching the validity and 
constitutionality of our occupying claimant laws"). 
19. "The manner of the decision has been as unhappy as the decision itself will be 
unsatisfactory. It was communicated as the opinion of three judges to one. Those three 
were Washington, Duval, & Story, Judge Johnson being the dissentient." Letter from 
Henry Clay to Benjamin Watkins Leigh (March 6, 1823) (cited in note 2). 
20. Letters of/, By Itself, Commentator (Frankfort, Ky.) 2 (Aug. 9, 1821); 3 (Aug. 
16, 1821); 2 (Aug. 23, 1821); 2 (Aug. 30, 1821). See also/, By Itself Broadside (republished 
by H. Marshall, Nov. 18, 1823), in Durrett Collection (Broadsides, Broadsheets, and Cir-
culars, Box 1, Folder 23) (Joseph Regenstein Ubrary, U. of Chicago). 
21. /, By Itself, Part II, Commentator (Frankfort, Ky.) at 3 (Aug. 16, 1821). "[I]f this 
is our situation, and we are prepared to bear it-our mouths may be bridled-our backs 
saddled-and we, rode away to the King's white hall!" /,By Itself, Part IV, at 2 (Aug. 30, 
1821). 
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cupying claimant laws? Should the Court place its own reading 
above the state parties?zz Inter-jurisdictional arbitration and me-
diation was highly familiar to Kentuckians-American commis-
sioners were meeting to settle matters with Spain under 
Pinckney's Treatyz3 and with Great Britain under the Treaty of 
Ghent.24 The possibility that a state might speak as a class repre-
sentative for its citizens' civil interests thus had a familiar analogy 
in international matters. Especially where the entitlement was 
created by the states' own compact, rather than arising from any 
claimed constitutional protection for all remedies concerning 
property, the role of a state as intermediary in resolving disputes 
was plausible. 
In Expose essays in 1823, one of which survives,zs Cousin 
Humphrey renewed his harry of the Justices for disdaining the 
Virginia-Kentucky negotiations and rushing to judgment with an 
under-staffed Court. The negotiations for setting up an arbitra-
tion panel ran into a snare in the Virginia Senate in early 1823, 
and rather than allow another session of the Virginia legislature 
to solve the difficulty, the Justices plowed ahead to judgment as a 
rump Court-four participating, three voting to condemn Ken-
tucky's law as a violation of the federal contracts clause. The 
Court's haste to act seemed evident when, after announcing the 
Court's decision in February 1823, Justice Bushrod Washington 
refused to release the opinion for another six months, holding 
the text under wraps until August 1823. 
Humphrey Marshall's second complaint went far beyond the 
lost jurisdiction of the arbitrators and the short-handed preten-
sion of the Supreme Court justices. Rather, it concerned the ap-
propriate power of self-determination in a republican system of 
22. Members of the Kentucky legislature debated whether they needed a guarantee 
of indemnity from the Virginia legislature against non-resident claimants, who might pur-
sue federal court remedies outside the arbitration. Opponents of the indemnity "con-
tended that the decision of the commissioners, if made in season, would probably 
influence the decision of the Supreme Court, as it would express the opinion of the par-
ties on the construction of a contract between them." Debate of the Kentucky Legislature, 
in Richmond Enquirer (Richmond, Va.) 3 (Nov. 26, 1822). If "one decision was favour-
able to us, the other would be ... It is asserted in conversation ... that Chief Justice 
Marshall had said that such a decision would in his opinion be the true one for the 
supreme court to make." To the Editor of the Lexington [Ky.} Monitor, Richmond En-
quirer at 3 (cited in note 18). 
23. Treaty of Friendship, Limits and Navigation Between the United States and the 
King of Spain, 8 Stat. 138, Treaty Ser. No. 325 (1795). 
24. Treaty of Peace and Amity Between His Britannic Majesty and the United 
States of America, 8 Stat. 218, Treaty Ser. No. 109 (1814). 
25. H. Marshall, An Expose, Of the final Opinion, of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, in the case of Green, against Biddle, Commentator (Frankfort, Ky.) 2 (Nov. 
15, 1823) (misprinted in masthead as 1821). 
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government. The Union was a structure of co-equal states, said 
Humphrey, and it was inconceivable that a compact of indepen-
dence should place an eternal servitude on the land. Analogies 
here waxed rich. Kentucky's good faith promises under the Vir-
ginia compact, signed to obtain self-governance, had deteriorated 
to "abject bondage"z6-a form of peonage or slavery, ravish-
ment, a colonial dependency unimaginable in independent 
America. The Court's "gauzy sophistry" reduced Kentucky to a 
servitude below other states: "if the compact with Virginia, was 
verily such as the court have made it, Kentucky should have been 
excluded from the Union as a mere appendage to Virginia[.]"z7 
In a Hobbesian tum, Humphrey doubted whether such a com-
pact could even be consistent with natural law: "whether the peo-
ple, or a nation, can bind themselves by compact, to ruin 
themselves, may well be doubted."zs The right of a state to un-
dertake measures affecting land was a central part of self-govern-
ment. The Virginia compact as read by the Court could prevent 
abolishing imprisonment for debt in the purchase of land, taxing 
land, or using the power of eminent domain to obtain land for 
public purposes. A republican legislature had a duty to respond 
to economic distress, especially where the unavailability of other 
institutional forms (e.g., the modem expedient of title insurance) 
left occupants without protection.z9 Kentucky "would ... have 
rejected" the compact as rewritten by the Court, for denuding 
her of the "proper and necessary exercise of internal legisla-
tion. "3o In his prospectus for a new edition of The History of 
Kentucky, in October 1823, Humphrey Marshall trumpeted that 
the Supreme Court decision "would render all legislation as to 
lands, held or claimed by Virginia warrants, a mere useless la-
bour ... there shall at least, be one record of the author's disap-
probation . . . of its perversion, and misapplication of the 
compact. "31 Where any other reading was possible, a republican 
26. Id. at 2. col. 1. The states should not be "dwarf-vassals" without the power to 
regulate land. See Preamble and Resolutions of the Legislature of Kentucky, in Argus of 
Western America (Frankfort, Ky.) 1 (Feb. 4, 1824). ("If one unaltered and unalterable 
system of laws was destined to regulate, in perpetuity, the concerns of the people of the 
republics of America ... why the afflicting expence of sustaining twenty-four different 
States ... ? Why ... are they taunted with the mock lineaments, contexture and aspect of 
sovereigns, when in very deed they are dwarf-vassals?") (emphasis in original). 
27. H. Marshall, An Expose at 2 (cited in note 25). 
28. ld. 
29. Land patents were not protected by warranties of title-the grantor state gave 
none, and even on resale, a private warrantor might become insolvent. 
30. H. Marshall, Occupying Claimants, The Harbinger (Frankfort, Ky.) 1 (Aug. 10, 
1825). 
31. Kentucky Reporter (Lexington, Ky.) (Oct. 20, Oct. 27, and Nov. 3, 1823). 
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judge should be loathe to read the Virginia compact to exclude 
these ordinary prerogatives of self-government. 
Cousin Humphrey's attack upon the Supreme Court had a 
sharp edge, not only because he was a faithful Federalist and en-
joyed frequent victories in the Court's land cases.32 His newspa-
per essays had the distinction of being adopted by the Kentucky 
legislature as part of the state's official remonstrance to the 
United States Congress concerning the decision in Green v. 
Biddle.33 
Kentucky Senator Richard Johnson, Congressman Robert 
Letcher, Governor John Adair, newly elected Speaker of the 
House Henry Clay, and others, suggested varied new solutions to 
deter the Supreme Court from overactive intrusion into state af-
fairs, greatly alarming John Marshall. Expand the Court, so that 
Justices familiar with western problems would join in its delibera-
tions.34 Forbid the Supreme Court from deciding cases involving 
land. Require a two-thirds majority to invalidate state laws on 
constitutional grounds.3s Require individual opinions from the 
Justices, to test their true concurrence in the decision.36 Give the 
Senate final appellate jurisdiction in constitutional cases, as a 
properly representative body. The Republican Guarantee Clause 
of the Federal Constitution could be used by Congress to reverse 
or constrain the Supreme Court's actions, for "no people could 
be free without control over their soil."37 If events required, said 
Humphrey Marshall, impeachment3s and even insurrection39 was 
a curative. 
32. See Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, Federal Courts in the Early Republic-Kentucky 
1789-1816 at 187-89 (Princeton U. Press, 1978). 
33. See Preamble and Resolutions of the Legislature of Kentucky, in Argus of West-
ern America (Frankfort, Ky.) 1 (Feb. 18, 1824). 
34. "In the Judiciary out of seven Judges we have but one," complained "A Western 
Citizen." "And the interpretation of the most important laws, and the decision of ques-
tions of the greatest moment, are submitted to a tribunal composed of men strangers to us 
and strangers to our respective codes." A Western Citizen, To the People of the United 
States, Commentator (Frankfort, Ky.) 1 (Jan. 23, 1822). 
35. On March 11, 1824, Senator Van Buren, "from the judiciary committee, reported 
a bill providing that no law of any of the states shall be rendered invalid without the 
concurrence of at least five judges of the supreme court; their opinions to be separately 
expressed." Congress, Kentucky Reporter (Lexington, Ky.) 3 (Apr. 5, 1824) (emphasis in 
original). 
36. Id. 
37. Remarks of John Rowan, Kentucky Legislature: House of Representatives, Dec. 
12, 1823, in Argus ~f Western America (Frankfort, Ky.) 2 (Dec. 17, 1823). See id ("He 
was averse to sneakmg by Congress as if afraid to be seen, and creeping into the court to 
beg where begging was vain ... "). 
" 38 .. From the Commentator, in ~entucky Gazette (Lexington, Ky.) 2 (Sept. 25, 1823) 
( Nothmg less than the clear expressiOn of one, or both branches of the national legisla-
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"[T]his is no longer a private controversy," Humphrey 
wrote. "A state has been disenfranchised. A state contends for 
her rights."40 "Kentucky will remember, if not detest, the court of 
the United States, as the pregnant cause of all the perplexity, in-
jury and embarrassment consequent upon every new occasion of 
a similar kind .... "41 "To tell her, that she has bartered away her 
rights of a free state, in a compact for independence, would add 
insult to injury .... Believe us, the sentiment of 'independence of 
Virginia and her laws,' other than those voluntarily adopted, ... 
is inbred and radical. The contrary doctrine ... may be hacked 
into their veins with the sword; but it would flow out again with 
their blood .... "42 
The recovery of a major text-a letter from John Marshall to 
Speaker of the House Henry Clay in 182343-shows John Mar-
shall's pronounced alarm at these efforts to restrict the Court's 
jurisdiction. "[I]t is among the most dangerous things ... to legis-
late for a nation under a strong excitement,'' said Marshall. "[I]t 
is not easy for the legislator, intent only on that object, ... to 
perc[ ei]ve and guard against the serious mischiefs with which his 
measure may bum." Proposals to increase the Court's size or 
"requir[ e] more than a majority of all the Judges to decide any 
case" caused Marshall a visible frisson, and evoked his strong ap-
peal to Clay's discretion. 
In particular, Marshall took alarm at Kentucky Senator 
Richard Johnson's proposal to increase the Court to ten Justices, 
by adding three new western and southwestern circuits, and to 
require the concurrence of seven Justices to hold state or federal 
ture, on impeachment, or otherwise, should quiet the insulted, and degraded rights of Ken-
tucky legislation.") (emphasis added). 
39. H. Marshall, An Expose at 2 (cited in note 25) ("Should I be placed in the legis-
lature, of which there is a possibility, it will be a primary object to obtain a proper repre-
sentation of the case, in the name of the commonwealth, to the Supreme court, in full 
session, for a rehearing and reversal of their decision. . . . if this course is not taken, a 
worse will be pursued; which may even lead the state to insurrection.") (emphasis in 
original). 
40. Marshall, Occupying Claimants, The Harbinger at 1 (cited in note 30). 
41. Id. at 1. 
42. The Remonstrance [Concluded], The Harbinger (Frankfort, Ky.) 1-2 (Aug. 17, 
1825) (emphasis in the original). 
43. Letter from John Marshall to Henry Clay (Dec. 22, 1823) (text reproduced at 
Appendix A). The Jetter has been known to scholars only by its date. See Irwin S. 
Rhodes, 2 The Papers of John Marshall: A Descriptive Calendar 220 (U. of Oklahoma 
Press, 1969); and Melba Porter Hay, et al., eds., The Papers of Henry Clay, Supplement 
1793-1852 at 305 (cited in note 2). The text was made available to the author at the sale of 
a manuscript collection in June 1990 in New York City. The letter is now in the Gilder 
Lehrman Collection, GLC 141, on deposit at the Pierpont Morgan Library, New York 
City, and is reproduced by generous permission of the Morgan Library. 
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laws unconstitutional.44 Johnson's proposal brought Chief Justice 
Marshall to protest his own faith that judicial review was imma-
nent in the Constitution. Marshall appealed to spirit and sensibil-
ity rather than to the cold logic of Marbury.4s "It is I think 
difficult to read that instrument attentively without feeling the 
conviction that it intends to provide a tribunal for every case of 
collision between itself and a law, so far as such case can assume 
a form for judicial inquiry; and a law incapable of being placed in 
such form can rarely have very extensive or pernicious effects. "46 
A proposal such as Johnson's might bind the court, the Chief 
Justice tocsined, even as it violated a legislator's duty: "[L]et me 
ask your attention ... whether it accords with the spirit of the 
constitution? If it goes to defeat an object which the constitution 
obviously designs to accomplish, I need not say to you that, 
although the judiciary may be bound by it, a conscientious legis-
lator can never assent to it."47 
The memory of Stuart v. Laird4B was still fresh: the Court 
had acquiesced in a new Republican Congress' decision to abol-
ish the federal circuit courts created by the Federalist Congress 
of 1801. John Marshall recused himself from William Paterson's 
opinion in Laird, but clearly despised it. As he said to Clay: 
If congress should say explicitly that the courts of the union 
should never enter into the enquiry concerning the constitu-
tionality of a law, or should dismiss for want of jurisdiction, 
every case depending on a law deemed by the court to be un-
constitutional, could there be two opinions respecting such an 
act? And what substantial difference is there between such a 
law, if law it may be called, and one which makes the decision 
to depend on an event which will seldom happen? What sub-
stantial difference is there between withdrawing a question 
from a court, and disabling a court from deciding that ques-
tion? Those only, I should think, who were capable of drawing 
the memorable distinction as to tenure of office, between remov-
44. "[T)remendous evils might result to the country," warned Senator Johnson, 
"from the powers imparted to its judiciary, when a whole State, and a State that had 
always been loyal to the Government, might be convulsed to its very centre by a judicial 
decision." Johnson proposed forming three additional circuits, for Tennessee and Ala-
bama, Mississippi and Louisiana, and Illinois and Missouri, and as well a law "to require a 
concurrence of at least seven judges in any opinion, which may involve the validity of the 
laws of the United States, or of the States respectively." See Remarks and Resolution of 
Senator Richard Johnson, 41 Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United 
States, 18th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 (Dec. 10, 1823). 
45. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
46. Letter from John Marshall to Henry Clay (Dec. 22, 1823), Appendix A. 
47. ld. 
48. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
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ing the Judge from the office, and removing the office from the 
Judge, can take this distinction.49 
Yet as Marshall remembered, Congress acted with just that logic 
in 1802. 
Marshall staked his appeal, finally, on the far-reaching prac-
tical consequences of Johnson's proposal. Though filmy on the 
surface, its disabling result seemed plain to him. "When we con-
sider the remoteness, the numbers, and the age of the Judges, we 
cannot expect that the assemblage of all of them, when they shall 
amount to ten, will be of frequent recurrence. The difficulty of 
the questions, and other considerations, may often divide those 
who do attend. To require almost unanimity, is to require what 
cannot often happen, and consequently to disable the court from 
deciding constitutional questions."so A "law requiring more than 
a majority to make a decision as much counteracts the views of 
the constitution as an act requiring more than a majority of the 
legislature to pass a law."sl 
The measures to limit constitutional jurisdiction were outrun 
by the Court's adroit retreat. Senator Johnson's proposal 
lingered in the Senate,sz while Kentucky state courts openly dis-
dained and defied the decisions in Green, relying on the small 
politeness that it was, after all, a short-handed Court. "[W]e still 
entertain the opinion, that the act of 1812, concerning occupying 
claimants, contains nothing incompatible with the constitution of 
the United States, or the compact between Virginia and Ken-
tucky," said Judge Owsley of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in 
1825. "[T]he case of Green v. Biddle, was decided by three only 
of the seven judges ... we have no hesitation, under the circum-
49. Letter from John Marshall to Henry Clay (Dec. 22, 1823), Appendix A (empha-
sis added). 
50. ld. 
51. Id. 
52. In April 1824, Daniel Webster wrote Justice Joseph Story that some "gentlemen 
of the West" had proposed "requiring the assent of a majority of all the judges to [any] 
judgment" holding a state law void under the federal Constitution. "Do you see any great 
evil in such a provision?" asked Webster. "Judge Todd told me he thought it would give 
great satisfaction in the West." Letter from Daniel Webster to Joseph Story (April 10, 
1824), in Charles M Wiltse, ed., The Papers of Daniel Webster: Co"espondence, 1798-
1824, at 356 (U. Press of New England, 1974). Joseph Story's Letterbooks also record a 
note of inquiry from Rufus King, New York's Federalist Senator, reciting and underlining 
the first phrase of Article III, "The Judicial Power of the U.S. shall be vested in one 
Supreme Court," and putting the "Question, may the supreme Court be so constituted, or 
changed by law, as to require more than a majority of the Judges to give a Decision?" 
Letter from Rufus King to Joseph Story (undated holograph in Letterbooks of Joseph 
Story, Manuscript Division, library of Congress) (notated by archivist as "1820?," but 
more likely to be 1824 or 1825) (emphasis in the original). 
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stances ... in not yielding to its authority."53 In 1827, the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals declared that the constitutionality of the 
1812 occupying claimant law was "no longer open to discussion 
... until some tribunal, capable of controlling this court, shall by 
its mandate set it again at large. "54 The Supreme Court acqui-
esced in this flouting, instructed as well by the Kentucky legisla-
ture's attempt to overthrow the state court of appeals by creating 
a rival court.55 The Supreme Court also pledged a rule of good 
housekeeping, promising that it would never again decide consti-
tutional questions except by an actual majority of the appointed 
Justices.56 
Finally yielding the long-sought quiet to Kentucky land ti-
tles, the Marshall Court in 1831 unanimously approved a new 
Kentucky statute shortening the time for suits over land. An ad-
verse possessor could keep improvements-and the land as 
well-after seven years, even though Virginia land law had re-
quired 20 years adverse possession. "Let the language of the 
[Virginia-Kentucky] compact be literally applied," said Justice 
Johnson in Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, on behalf of a new ma-
jority that included Marshall, Duvall, and Story, "and we have 
the anomaly presented of a sovereign state governed by the laws 
of another sovereign."57 "It can scarcely be supposed that Ken-
tucky would have consented to accept a limited and crippled sov-
ereignty .... "5s This retreat signalled a deep change in the 
Court's view of vested rights, and may be taken as a companion, 
even as incubus, to the more famous evolution in the Court's 
53. Bodley v. Gaither, 19 Ky. (3 T.B. Monroe) 57, 58-59 (Ky. Ct. App. 1825). 
54. Sanders's Heirs v. Nonon, 20 Ky. (4 T.B. Monroe) 464,465 (Ky. Ct. App. 1827) 
(Mills, J.) (emphasis added). Accord M'Kinney v. Carroll, 21 Ky. (5 T.B. Monroe) 96, 97-
98 (1827) (Mills, J.). 
55. See Arndt M. Stickles, The Critical Coun Struggle in Kentucky, 1819-29 (Indiana 
U. Press, 1929); Lowell H. Harrison and James C. Klotter, A New History of Kentucky 
109-112 (U. Press of Kentucky, 1997). 
56. In a challenge to a state debtor relief statute, the Court delayed action for two 
successive terms, because Todd was ill and the Court lacked a majority. The Court then 
upheld the insolvency statute by a split vote, with Marshall, Story, and Duvall dissenting. 
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827). Marshall confirmed this new rule 
of prudence in Briscoe v. Commonwealth's Bank of Kentucky and New York City v. Miln, 
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 118, 122 (1834): 
The practice of this court is, not (except in cases of absolute necessity) to deliver 
any judgment in cases where constitutional questions are involved, unless four 
judges concur in opinion, thus making the decision that of a majority of the 
whole court. In the present cases four judges do not concur in opinion as to the 
constitutional questions which have been argued. The court therefore direct 
these cases to be reargued at the next term, under the expectation that a larger 
number of the judges may then be present. 
57. Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457, 467 (1831). 
58. Id. at 547. 
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treatment of legislative power over corporate charters, from 
Dartmouth Colleges9 to Charles River Bridge,f><l and state insol-
vency laws, from Sturges v. Crowninshie/d6t to Ogden v. Saun-
ders,62 all the more striking since Marshall, Story, and Duvall 
came along in Hawkins without dissent. By 1874, the Congress 
had added its own imprimatur to the justice of occupying claim-
ant statutes.63 
An equally important part of the story is to gain a sense of 
how opponents of the Court saw their efforts. This was, from one 
vantage, a more innocent time in our history, when jurisdictional 
questions were not mere watchwords for racial politics, when 
gradual emancipation of slaves was still debated even in the 
South. Issues of state autonomy did not reduce, always and 
everywhere, to simple apologies for racism. Local resistors 
against Supreme Court authority in the land law controversy saw 
themselves as part of a broad movement of republicanism and 
self-determination. The Kentucky newspapers of the early 1820s 
are filled with news of the success of Simon Bolivar against Span-
ish monarchists in South America, bulletins hailing the struggle 
of the Greeks against the Turks, and Italy's fight for indepen-
dence. Early recognition of the independence of Latin American 
countries was championed by Henry Clay. The issuance of the 
Monroe Doctrine to protect the new republics against Spanish 
attempts at reconquest marked the romantic sense that republi-
canism was still in advance, that the American model had not lost 
its worldwide appeal. Americans on the frontier did not see 
themselves as remote from the broader sweep of history, and in 
this self-conception they were aided even by Lord Byron, whose 
poems were reprinted in Kentucky newspapers: The Age of 
Bronze praised Washington and Franklin as heroes left to the 
world after Nelson's death and Napoleon's shrinkage from Jupi-
59. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
60. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). 
61. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). 
62. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). 
63. See An Act for the Benefit of Occupying Claimants, 18 Stat. 50, ch. 200 (1874): 
[W]hen an occupant of land, having color of title, in good faith has made valua-
ble improvements thereon, and is, in the proper action, found not to be the 
rightful owner thereof, such occupant shall be entitled in the Federal courts to 
all the rights and remedies, and, upo!l instituting the proper proceedings, _such 
relief as may be given or secured to hun by the statutes of the State or Temtory 
where the land lies, although the title ofthe plaintiff in the action may have been 
granted by the United States after said improvements were so made. 
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ter to Neptune;64 Don Juan praised Daniel Boone and his band 
as unspoiled men, virtuous models for the world.6s 
Kentucky resistors saw themselves as serving the experimen-
talism of American political science. The adaptation of principles 
of natural justice to the American scene required the empiricism 
familiar to Franklin, and state autonomy served this end. "By the 
genius of the free governments instituted here, great inroads 
were necessarily made in the code of England," said Charles 
Humphreys to the Kentucky Institute in his Sketch of the Science 
of Law. "[E]ach state must perfect its own system." The thwart-
ing particularity of American law was all to the good, allowing 
safe experiment and innovation. "Young states, as well as young 
men, display enterprize." "A greater variety of experiments can 
be made without involving such important consequences, as if 
they operated on the whole nation; and if the results are benefi-
cial, other states can follow the example."66 Each state's system 
of jurisprudence had an ethos that a nondomiciliary could not 
easily understand. A Justinian would have to "go in person from 
state to state to inform himself" and "stay in each long enough to 
read, compare, study and understand the true spirit of the juris-
prudence of the country; and before he could go half round the 
circle, the progress of legislation in the states which he had left, 
would render his . . . performance almost valueless. "67 Property 
law and land law did not stand outside this healthy process of 
adaptation, Charles Humphrey remarked: 
64. The Age of Bronze, Argus of Western America (Frankfort, Ky.) 1 (July 2, 1823): 
[T]hat hallowed name I Which freed the Atlantic? May we hope the same I For 
outworn Europe? ... I The prophets of young freedom, summoned far I From 
climes of Washington and Bolivar; I Henry, the forest-born Demosthenes, I 
Whose thunder shook the Philip of the seas; I And Stoic Franklin's energetic 
shade, I Robed in the lightnings which his hand allay'd; I And Washington the 
tyrant-tamer, wake, I To bid us blush for these old chains, or break. 
65. See Daniel Boon, From the last Canto of "Don Juann, Kentucky Reporter (Lex-
ington, Ky.) 4 (Oct. 6, 1823); also in Argus of Western America (Frankfort, Ky.) 3 (Oct. 
15, 1823): 
Of all the great names which in our faces stare, I The GENERAL BooNE, back 
woodsman of Kentucky, I Was happiest amongst mortals any where; II ... 
around him grew I A sylvan tribe of children of the chase, II ... tall and strong 
and swift of foot ... I Beyond the dwarfing city's pale abortions, I Because their 
thoughts had never been the prey I Of care, of gain; the green woods were their 
portions; I ... I Corruption could not make their hearts her soil. 
Byron's local hero lost his own lands in Kentucky through "the niceties of law ... The few 
lands he afterwards was enabled to locate, were through his ignorance generally swal-
lowed up, and lost by better claims." To the Honorable the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives of the General Assembly for the State of Kentucky, The Memorial of Daniel 
Boone, in the Kentucky Gazette (Lexington, Ky.) 1 (Feb. 4, 1812). 
66. C. Humphreys, A Sketch of the Science of Law in the United States, Read Before 
the Kentucky Institution, Kentucky Reporter (Lexington, Ky.) 1 (June 21, 1824}. 
67. ld. 
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Real actions have always been considered the most abstruse 
part of the law; and all adjudications, connected with the in-
vestigation of land titles, require much learning and experi-
ence. The character of legal tenures in Kentucky was peculiar, 
growing out of the particular nature of the statutes of Virginia 
disposing of her waste lands; and a course of decisions has 
been adopted in Kentucky, under the particular circumstances 
of the country, that lawyers resident elsewhere could not an-
ticipate; yet by the most enlightened men of the country, it was 
considered equitable and necessary.68 
And indeed, in his letter to Kentucky critic Henry Clay, John 
Marshall conceded that perhaps his jurisprudence was dated, fac-
ing the privilege of youth "to disregard entirely the wise sayings 
of the old. "69 
It was within this setting that the attacks against John Mar-
shall's Court carried a particular sting. The Court was likened to 
the Holy Alliance, Europe's counter-revolutionary triad quelling 
republican dissent, and in this metaphor, John Marshall was Met-
ternich. "[W]e are assailed by an army of Judges armed with con-
structions," said the Argus of Western America. "[B]y placing 
them above popular control it is attempted to make their opin-
ions as final and as fatal to the liberties of the people and the rule 
of majorities as the bayonets of the Holy Alliance of Europe."?o 
Classical Rome also provided analogy: a Court which declined to 
release opinions promptly resembled the Roman emperor who 
wrote his decrees too high on the wall to be read. "[T]hree men, 
a minority of the Judges, have prostrated a system of Laws which 
has been thought essential to their prosperity by almost half a 
million of people constituting an independent state," lamented 
the Argus. "Nor would they permit [remonstrant counsel] 
Messrs. Rowan and Clay to have a copy of the Opinion, unless 
they would pledge themselves not to publish it! ... we could not 
help thinking of the Roman tyrant who posted his laws so high, 
that no man could read them, and then punished his people for 
violating them. "71 
The style of opinions also came under siege: the Court's 
opinions were like imperial edicts, with obedience demanded 
from force, not persuasion, for the issue most in dispute was an-
68. Id. 
69. Letter from John Marshall to Henry Clay (Dec. 22, 1823), Appendix A. 
70. Wictorian Dinner, No. /, . . . The curtain drawn from the Holy Alliance of 
America, Argus of Western America (Frankfort, Ky.) 3 (Feb. 11, 1824). See also id, at 2, 
3, (Feb. 18, 1824). 
71. Occupying Claimant Laws, Argus of Western America 2 (May 21, 1823). 
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nounced ex cathedra as self-evident and inexorably true.n "Nice 
verbal distinctions and learned metaphysical constructions" were 
substituted for popular understanding. It was "the most alarming 
of all doctrines" that 
the Judges in determining upon the constitutional powers of 
the people's representatives in the state governments, may to-
tally disregard all legislative, popular and practical expositions 
of the constitution, adopted by all the departments of govern-
ment ... and substitute for this universal understanding and 
practice, their own SUPPOSITIONS of what the constitution 
may be, deduced from nice verbal distinctions and learned 
metaphysical constructions. This doctrine sweeps from the 
people and from every branch of the government, except the 
Judiciary, the right of understanding and expounding the con-
stitution ... these men would bring the people's fundamental 
law as completely within their grasp as was the civil code 
within the power of Rome's tyrant Emperors ... J3 
The Supreme Court's unitary voice, without individual seria-
tim opinions, also brought analogy to the primus inter pares of 
earlier triumvirates. And veering from one civil war to another, 
puckish Kentucky critics summoned Country against Court. 
"The Court Party contend, that the people have no right ... to 
make occupying claimant laws, to remunerate those persons who 
have devoted a long life of labor and toil, in improving lands 
which they had every reason to believe their own," levelled the 
Argus. 
Kentucky now has her Federalists and Republicans, her Court 
Party and her Country Party . ... People of Kentucky, ... be 
upon your guard, not against the wild man of the woods; but a 
more dangerous enemy, the Federalists and the Aristocrats of 
the Court Party, who are endeavoring to ... reduce you to a 
72. Patrick Henry, No. XI, Argus of Western America (Frankfort, Ky.) 2, 3 (June 9, 
1824) (emphasis in original): 
It is almost the invariable practice of Chief Justice Marshall, the great file leader, 
(on the heels of whom the Chief Justice of Kentucky is always found except 
when pressed by impatience he takes the lead ... ) on all constitutional questions 
which disrobe the states of power, to reject all state and popular precedents, 
frequently basing the arguments which conduct to his decision on his naked as-
sertion of what he is pleased to call truths none can have the boldness to deny, 
but which are in fact the very points in dispute. This practice corresponds admi-
rably with that of the tyrant who disdained in his order to assign any cause. 
"Decius said, most mighty Caesar, let me know some cause, lest I be laughed at 
when I tell them so." 
"Caesar replied, "the cause is in my will." 
73. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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condition, little better than that enjoyed by your ancestors as 
British colonists.74 
These attacks upon the Supreme Court in the 1820s never 
led to any radical restriction of the Court's jurisdiction, in part 
because the Court acquiesced in the parties' disobedience. The 
Court grew more regular in its practices, avoiding short-handed 
decisions, and became a more representative institution with the 
addition of two additional justices in 1837.75 The tensions of the 
Southern position in regard to federal power were also an obsta-
cle-even as they denounced Supreme Court intrusion into do-
mestic affairs, Kentucky and other frontier states were eager for 
federal sponsorship of internal improvements and thus were se-
duced by the Supreme Court's generous construction of Congres-
sional powers in the McCulloch bank case.76 But the failure of 
the tinder to catch fire should not blind us to what was attractive 
in the Southern position, especially as a source of challenge to 
current interpretive practices. John Marshall's opponents, includ-
ing Cousin Humphrey, saw themselves as celebrating self-deter-
mination and republican independence in a world that was still 
young. 
74. Argus of Western America (Frankfort, Ky.) 3 (June 30, 1824) (emphasis in 
original). 
75. See Judiciary Act of 1837, ch. 34, 5 Stat. 176. 
76. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See Harry N. Scheiber, 
The Transportation Revolution and American Law: Constitutionalism and Public Policy, in 
Transportation and the Early Nation (Indiana Historical Society, 1982). 
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APPENDIX A 
LEITER FROM JOHN MARSHALL 
TO HENRY CLAY, WASHINGTON 
Richmond Dec' 22d 1823 
267 
Your favour of the l1 1h reached me in due time and I can 
assure you that its perusal gave me no "trouble". With an abate-
ment, which I dare say you are prepared to expect, that is-that 
few non residents of Kentucky will concur with the citizens of 
that state in opinion, either on their laws respecting the occu-
pants of lands, or what is miscalled their "relief system", I had a 
sort of half way disposition to think with you on several points, 
till that section of my mind which was disposed to arrange itself 
with you was completely routed by M' Johnsons proposition in 
the Senate. That gentleman, I percieve has moved a resolution 
requiring a concurrence of more than a majority of all the Judges 
of the supreme court to decide that a law is repugnant to the 
constitution. 
It is the privilege of age to utter wise sayings somewhat like 
proverbs, in the shape of counsel, as a substitute for that power-
ful and convincing argument which it has lost the faculty of mak-
ing; but this privilege is more than countervailed by another 
which is possessed and generally exercised by the middle aged as 
well as the young-it is to disregard entirely the wise sayings of 
the old. When I exercise my privilege, I am not quite so old or so 
unreasonable as to suspect that you are not in perfect readiness 
to exercise yours also. 
But for the apothegm. If I do not come to it quickly you will 
think I waste more time in preparing for it than it is worth after 
being introduced. I will say then at once that it is among the most 
dangerous things in legislation to enact a general law of great and 
extensive influence to effect a particular object; or to legislate for 
a nation under a strong excitement which must be suspected to 
influence the judgement. If the mental eye be directed to a single 
object, it is not easy for the legislator, intent only on that object, 
to look all around him, and to percieve and guard against the 
serious mischiefs with which his measure may burn. I am perhaps 
more alive to what concerns the judicial department, and attach 
more importance to its organization, than my fellow citizens in 
the legislature or executive, but let me ask if serious inconven-
ience is not to be apprehended from a very numerous supreme 
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court? It ought not to be too small; but the one extreme is as 
much to be avoided as the other. 
Let me ask too, and I put the question very seriously if a 
regulation requiring a concurrence of more than a majority of all 
the Judges to decide any case, ought not to be well considered in 
all its bearings, before its adoption? To say nothing of the influ-
ence of such a rule on the business of the court, let me ask your 
attention to the inquiry whether it accords with the spirit of the 
constitution? If it goes to defeat an object which the constitution 
obviously designs to accomplish, I need not say to you that, 
although the judiciary may be bound by it, a conscientious legis-
lator can never assent to it. It is I think difficult to read that in-
strument attentively without feeling the conviction that it intends 
to provide a tribunal for every case of collision between itself and 
a law, so far as such case can assume a form for judicial inquiry; 
and a law incapable of being placed in such form can rarely have 
very extensive or pernicious effects. 
If this be the obvious intention of the constitution, can the 
legislature withdraw such cases from that tribunal without 
counteracting its views and defeating its objects? If congress 
should say explicitly that the courts of the union should never 
enter into the enquiry concerning the constitutionality of a law, 
or should dismiss for want of jurisdiction, every case depending 
on a law deemed by the court to be unconstitutional, could there 
be two opinions respecting such an act? And what substantial 
difference is there between such a law, if law it may be called, 
and one which makes the decision to depend on an event which 
will seldom happen? What substantial difference is there be-
tween withdrawing a question from a court, and disabling a court 
from deciding that question? Those only, I should think, who 
were capable of drawing the memorable distinction as to tenure 
of office, between removing the Judge from the office, and re-
moving the office from the Judge, can take this distinction. 
That the measure proposed in the senate has this tendency is 
not, I presume, doubted by any person; that it will very often 
have this effect practically is, I think, as little to be questioned. 
When we consider the remoteness, the numbers, and the age of 
the Judges, we cannot expect that the assemblage of all of them, 
when they shall amount to ten, will be of frequent recurrence. 
The difficulty of the questions, and other considerations, may 
often divide those who do attend. To require almost unanimity, is 
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to require what cannot often happen, and consequently to dis-
able the court from deciding constitutional questions. 
A majority of the court is according to constant usage and 
the common understanding of mankind, as much the court, as the 
majority of the legislature, is the legislature; and it seems to me 
that a law requiring more than a majority to make a decision as 
much counteracts the views of the constitution as an act requiring 
more than a majority of the legislature to pass a law. 
But I will detain you no longer with my prosing & will only 
add that I am with great respect & esteem 
your obed1 Serv1 
J Marshall 
